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ENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES
THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Abstract. We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic ﬁrm in general
equilibrium when the ﬁrm’s decision are taken through shareholder vot-
ing. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational
voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative
to the eﬃcient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilib-
rium, if individuals do not recognize their inﬂuence on voting when
trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling
constraints the only equilibrium is the eﬃcient one. With short-selling
constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power
itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the
rights to market power.
1. Introduction
Under perfect competition, proﬁt or net market value maximization of
ﬁrms are derived from the goals of the shareholders, since it maximizes their
wealth at a given price system. Moreover, the price normalization problem
does not occur, since a complete system of relative prices is taken as given
and it suﬃces to compare the values of diﬀerent production plans.
Under imperfect competition, however, questions about the suitability
and appropriateness of proﬁt or net market value maximization arose early
on. As for suitability, the lack of fairly general equilibrium existence results
was a concern. Standard techniques turned out to have little impact in many
instances, while non-existence was established in some other instances. As
for appropriateness, the objective of proﬁt or net market value maximiza-
tion is questionable if ﬁrms exercise market power. In certain models, even
the deﬁnition of proﬁts is dubious because of the price normalization or
num´ eraire problem. Moreover, shareholders often tend to disagree about
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the objectives the ﬁrm should pursue, and none of them may favor proﬁt
maximization.
Recently, advances have occurred in both suitability and appropriateness.
The existence problem has been mitigated by novel results on the aggrega-
tion of demand. New insights regarding the proper objectives of ﬁrms have
been gained by looking at the problem from diﬀerent angles.
When ﬁrms exercise market power and maximize nominal proﬁts, the
price normalization has real eﬀects as ﬁrst pointed out by Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972). Diﬀerent real outcomes would then be obtained under diﬀerent
price normalization rules; see Grodal (1996), Haller (1986). Lately, B¨ ohm
(1994) and Dierker and Grodal (1996) have attempted to address or resolve
this issue. A further issue is that when a ﬁrm has market power, net market
value maximization may not be supported by the shareholders who often
disagree on the objectives the ﬁrm should undertake. Thus the need to
reconcile or aggregate shareholder interests arises. Shareholder voting may
be the solution. This paper therefore introduces shareholder voting instead
of postulating proﬁt maximization.
The direction the literature has taken is to focus on the existence of
shareholder voting equilibria. Sadanand and Williamson (1991) established
existence of equilibria with shareholders voting in stock markets. DeMarzo
(1993) has shown that in some cases where a voting equilibrium exist, the
ﬁrm’s production plan is optimal for the largest shareholder of the ﬁrm. In
a general equilibrium model with certain externalities between production
and consumption, Kelsey and Milne (1996) show the existence of a simulta-
neous equilibrium with competitive exchange in markets where consumers
and producers are price-takers, but each ﬁrm’s production decisions are de-
termined by an internal collective choice criterion.
In this paper we analyze the impact of a distribution of share owner-
ship on the behavior and eﬃciency of a monopolist in a general equilibrium
framework, when the ﬁrm’s decisions are taken through shareholder voting.
Since the ﬁrm’s decisions are taken through voting among its owners, we en-
sure consistency between preferences of the shareholders and the objective
of the ﬁrm. In other words the objective function is endogenized. There-
fore, the price normalization issue is never a question since an imperfectly
competitive ﬁrm would by no means maximize proﬁts. Moreover, imperfect
competition generates bad outcome
1 if ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizing. How-
ever, if ﬁrms are not proﬁt maximizing, imperfect competition need not be
bad as such. Whether imperfectly competitive ﬁrms need to be regulated
1For instance, a ﬁrm exercising monopoly power can raise its price above marginal cost.
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would depend on the distribution of shares in the economy. The reason the
distribution of shares matters is that when the ﬁrm has market power it
can alter the prices in such a way that redistribution among shareholders
occurs, depending on the shareholders’ endowments. If shareholders diﬀer
in their endowments they would support diﬀerent production plans. The
distribution of endowments would aﬀect the identity of the median voter in
the ﬁrm, and therefore aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s behavior.
Roemer (1993), in a related paper examining the role of distribution, mod-
els a situation in which a ﬁrm’s production causes a negative externality. All
individuals have the same preferences but diﬀer in share endowments. The
ﬁrm’s production decisions are taken through shareholder voting. He shows
that the more right-skewed the distribution of share ownership is, i.e., the
poorer the median voter is relative to the average, the more production and
the more of the externality the ﬁrm produces. Another related paper analyz-
ing the distribution of share ownership is by Renstrom and Roszbach (1998).
They analyze wage setting by a monopoly union, when union members own
shares in the ﬁrm. Union members vote on the wage rate and the ﬁrm is
a price taker. They reach similar conclusions to Roemer, that the more
right-skewed the distribution of share ownership among union members the
higher is the demanded wage rate and the higher is unemployment.
Most of the literature analyzes situations where share ownership is exoge-
nous and there is no trade in shares. An exception is Geraats and Haller
(1998) who have conducted a study to analyze the outcome of a single ma-
jority voting among shareholders of a single ﬁrm with one dimensional pro-
duction decision. The asset market is eﬀective by assumption and the safe
asset is chosen to be the num´ eraire. As a result of their assumption on
a stock market economy, a shareholder voting equilibrium (i.e., a median
voter outcome in before-trade voting) exists and is essentially unique. They
ﬁnd that no sophisticated shareholder supports the production plan which
maximizes the net market value of the ﬁrm. An investor’s preferred pro-
duction plan depends, as a rule, on his (initial or ﬁnal) share holding and
his risk aversion. Distributional assumptions regarding initial shareholdings
and risk aversion parameters prove crucial for the median voter outcome.
Our paper diﬀers from the previous papers in that we shall analyze the
consequences of distribution and market structure for behavior and eﬃciency
of a monopoly ﬁrm. The economy consists of a two-sector, three-good econ-
omy with Cobb-Douglas preferences. Heterogeneity among individuals are
due to diﬀerences in shareholdings and initial endowments with labor and,
at a later stage, in labor productivity.4 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
First, we model a benchmark case when the monopoly ﬁrm acts as a per-
fect competitor, i.e., ignores its market power and behaves as a price taker,
which we label the Competitive Economic Equilibrium (CEE). The CEE
allocation is Pareto-optimal. We then consider two cases where one or the
other consumption good serves as num´ eraire and also convex combinations
of these two price normalizations. We show that the CEE allocation is not
obtained in either of these cases, if the monopolist realizes its market power
[Proposition 3.2].
As for consumers, a consumer prefers the monopolist to choose a higher/
equal/ lower output than the CEE level if and only if that consumer’s endow-
ment of shares is lower/ equal/ higher than her relative endowment of labor
[Proposition 4.2]. This has an immediate implication for the case when the
median voter determines the monopolist’s production decision [Proposition
4.3]. In particular, if consumers are identical in their labor endowments and
public ownership, then the CEE results [Proposition 4.4]. Two more results
are derived when variation in labor endowments is replaced by variation in
labor productivity.
Thus, when the shareholders realize that the ﬁrm has market power, ra-
tional voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative
to the CEE. For a certain distribution of shares the CEE allocation is ob-
tained. These are results for an exogenous distribution of shares. Finally,
we deal with the issue of opening up the stock market, allowing individ-
uals to trade their endowments. Since we have no risk present, the only
reasons for trading share endowments are either to purchase a share that
oﬀers higher return than another or to strategically gain voting rights to
inﬂuence the political outcome of the monopoly ﬁrm. This raises questions
of to what extend individuals perceive themselves changing the decision of
the ﬁrm, and what ﬁnancial positions that are allowed. We therefore ana-
lyze two situations, one in which individuals do not recognize their inﬂuence
on the political equilibrium in the ﬁrm when they trade shares, and one
in which they do. When they do not recognize their inﬂuence, then any
distribution of shares in an equilibrium. This is because share prices will be
such that no one has an incentive to trade given the expectations about the
voting outcome [Proposition 5.1]. When individuals recognize that trading
in shares will alter the distribution of share ownership, and consequently
the voting outcome, then in the absence of short-selling constraints the only
equilibrium is the CEE allocation and all shareholders agree [Proposition
5.2]. Individuals then hold portfolios to match their endowments of labor
and initial wealth. This result changes when short-selling constraints are
introduced, and we are more likely to get underproduction in the monopolyENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 5
sector [Proposition 5.3]. This leads us to a conclusion that it is not market
power itself that causes underproduction, and consequently overpricing, but
the inability to trade the rights to market power. These conclusions are in
line with the Coase Theorem established by Coase (1960), which did not say
anything about non-competitive economies, however.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
formal assumptions of the model, the equilibrium concept, and discusses the
general strategy for modelling imperfect competition in a general equilibrium
setting. Section 3 deals with the Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium allocations (the
CEE), the benchmark for the analysis in this paper. Section 4 endogenizes
the objective of the ﬁrm through shareholder voting. Section 5 allows trade
in shares prior to the voting stage. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
Consider an economy in which ﬁrms are distinguished between two types,
perfect competitors and a single monopoly, so that there are two sectors,
(k = 1,2). The former takes prices as given, while the monopoly ﬁrm
observes that it can inﬂuence the price system in a given market. In the
perfectly competitive sector a single commodity is produced by a continuum
of ﬁrms, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. The aggregate output from the perfectly
competitive sector will be denoted by y1. The monopoly ﬁrm produces y2.
The proﬁt in each sector is measured by
pkyk − ωlk,
where pk is the price of commodity k, lk is the labor used in sector k,
and ω is the wage rate. We shall assume that labor, the only factor of
production, is elastically supplied to the production sectors by consumers
at their competitive prices.
There is continuum of heterogeneous consumers, indexed by h ∈ [0,1].
Consumer h consumes xh
1 unit of commodity 1 and xh
2 unit of commodity 2.
Each consumer is assumed to be a shareholder in both sectors. The fraction
of the competitive sector owned by consumer h is denoted by θh
1 and her
share of the monopoly ﬁrm is given by θh
2. The consumers derive income
from labor and the share ownership.
Assumption 2.1 (Consumer Characteristics). The consumers’ preferences
over consumption and labor are given by the Cobb-Douglas utility function,
that is,
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where a,b > 0 and Lh is the total time available for each consumer. The




1 (p1y1 − ωl1) + θh
2 (p2y2 − ωl2) + ωlh.
Assumption 2.2 (Firm Characteristics). Firm j in the competitive sector




























where 0 < α ≤ 1 and ε
j
1 > 0. The production technology for the monopoly
ﬁrm is given by
y2 = G(l2) = B (l2)
β , l2 ≥ ε2
y2 = 0, l2 < ε2,
(2.4)
where 0 < β < 1, and ε2 > 0.
We have assumed minimum production levels in both sectors. For in-
stance, if a ﬁrm wishes to produce less than Aj(ε
j
1)α it must produce zero,
i.e., close down. This is to avoid prices going to inﬁnity in the limit. Exact
conditions on ε1 will be stated later on in Lemma 4.1.
2.1. Economic Equilibrium for Given Monopoly Behavior. Maxi-
mizing Equation (2.1) subject to (2.2) and taking prices as given yields the
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1 + a + b
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1 (p1y1 − ωl1) + θh
2 (p2y2 − ωl2) + ωLh
i
.
Because of the Cobb-Douglas utility characterization, consumer h’s expen-
diture share for each commodity is independent of income. This in turn
implies Linear Engel Curves, which is a convenient property when dealing
with consumer heterogeneity.
The market clearing prices in the economy are conveniently solved for by
the market clearing conditions, that is,2
(2.8)
Z
lhdh = l1 + l2 = l,
2Note that the symbol
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Lhdh is the total aggregate time available.
Therefore, the relative prices in the economy will be a function of the ag-
gregate quantities produced and the aggregate labor used in the production
process. A competitive ﬁrm would take these prices as given when making
its production decisions, while the monopoly ﬁrm would realize that it can
inﬂuence these prices. Using the price system in the exchange equilibrium
the consumers’ consumption decisions as a function of the produced quanti-
ties may be obtained. Hence, Equations (2.5) and (2.6) together with (2.11)
yield
(2.14) xh
1 = ψh (l1,l2)y1,
(2.15) xh
2 = ψh (l1,l2)y2,
and Equation (2.7) together with (2.11) yield
(2.16) Lh − lh = ψh (l1,l2)(L − l),
where















1 + a + b
Remark 2.3. We shall note that this economy has linear sharing rules, where
ψh is consumer h’s share of each of the aggregate goods.













Remark 2.4. It is evident that there is no interior solution unless α < 1.
However, we can allow for the case when α = 1. If α = 1 the equilibrium
wage must be w/p1 = maxj Aj. Only the ﬁrms with the largest productivity8 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
will operate. We still assume that there is a large number of those ﬁrms.
When α = 1 the wage rate normalized by Sector 1 price will be a constant
and cannot be aﬀected by the monopolist ﬁrm’s decision. Our results for
the rest of the paper still remain unchanged. This is important to notice,
because our results do not come from manipulating w/p1.











˜ A(L − l2)
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If α = 1 we take ˜ A to be the aggregate productivity of the ﬁrms with
maxj Aj. In the rest of the analysis α = 1 is possible.
The monopoly ﬁrm indirectly aﬀects output and employment in the com-
petitive sector by means of the variable l2, the labor used in the imperfectly
competitive sector.
3. Economic Equilibria under Exogenous Objectives of the
Monopoly Firm
If the behavior of the monopoly ﬁrm is such that it chooses l2 so as to
maximize its proﬁt, then there will be two benchmark cases. In the ﬁrst case,
the monopoly ﬁrm acts as a competitive ﬁrm and takes the price system
in the economy as given. In the other case, the monopoly ﬁrm realizes
its inﬂuence on the market prices and takes that into account when proﬁt
maximizing.
3.1. Monopoly as a Competitive Firm. This case yields a Pareto eﬃ-
cient equilibrium outcome and will be the benchmark for the analysis in this
paper. We shall label it Competitive Economic Equilibrium. The monopoly
ﬁrm then chooses l2 to solve
(3.1) maxl2 p2B (l2)
β − ωl2.




b + α + aβ
L,
3See Appendix A.
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BLβ.
Hence, Equations (3.2)-(3.5) completely describe the real equilibrium out-
come in the economy.
Remark 3.1. The Competitive Economic Equilibrium is independent of the
distribution of shares. This aggregation result follows from the linearity in
the Engel curves. This holds for any additively separable or multiplicative
HARA utility characterization.
3.2. Monopoly Power. When the monopoly ﬁrm is proﬁt maximizing it
does matter which price is used as a num´ eraire, that is, in which good proﬁts
are measured. If proﬁts are measured in terms of good 1, then the following








and if proﬁts are measured in term of good 2, then the proﬁt function
becomes




Consider now a ﬁrm objective as a linear combination of π1 and π2, that
is,
(3.8) maxl2 λπ1 (l2) + (1 − λ)π2 (l2).
Proposition 3.2. When the monopoly ﬁrm realizes its inﬂuence on the
price system, then there exists no weighted proﬁt maximization rule (3.8)
such that the Competitive Economic Equilibrium is reached.5
Proof. Here we shall not give a formal proof of the Proposition (3.2), but
rather sketch the proof.








2 is the competitive quantity as described by Equation (3.3).
5We shall note that there are other proﬁt maximization rules rather than those of the
form (3.8). First of all, labor could be used as a num´ eraire. Secondly, there are price
normalization rules which are not convex combinations of the num´ eraire rules.10 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Since the monopoly ﬁrm takes into account the endogeneity of prices,

















Considering the behavior of the competitive sector characterized by Equa-
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2) < 0 and π0
2 (l∗
2) < 0, which follow by evaluating the derivatives
at the CEE quantity of l2 in Equation (3.3). This completes the sketch of
the proof. 
Remark 3.3. The economic equilibrium when the monopoly ﬁrm maximizes
proﬁt is independent of the distribution of shares. Hence, the aggregation
property remains unchanged even when the monopoly ﬁrm uses its inﬂuence
on the equilibrium prices.
Notice that when λ = 1 in (3.8), the maximizing l2 = ε2 > 0, the assumed
minimum production level. Obviously, one may ask whether there is a non-














(1 − a)α + (1 + α)βa + b
(1 − β)(b + α + αa)
,
this is the case. It is clear that the monopolist needs to recognize the inﬂu-
ence on p0 with respect to l2 for this to work. If an objective of maximizing
proﬁts in terms of p0 is speciﬁed, individual shareholders will generally dis-
agree upon which p0 to use. The ideal price index for each individual does




2 , so we cannot simply ask shareholders
to express preferences over η. Instead, we will ask shareholders to express
preferences over l2, recognizing the general equilibrium price consequences.
Eventually, we will deﬁne a shareholder voting equilibrium where l2 will be
determined. This is the topic of next section.ENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 11
4. Endogenous Firm Objectives
Substituting the competitive sector’s quantities (2.19) and (2.20) into
(2.14)-(2.16), we obtain consumer h’s consumption in terms of the monop-
oly ﬁrm activity l2. If we substitute these quantities into (2.1), we obtain
consumer h’s indirect utility, that is,





aβ (L − l2)
α+b ,
where
(4.2) ψh (l2) =
θh
1 (1 − α) + θh
2

a − (α + b) l2
L−l2

+ (α + b) Lh
L−l2
1 + a + b
.
We shall note that l2 aﬀects the consumers share of the aggregate output
through two channels. First, through her share in the monopoly ﬁrm and
second, through her time endowment. A decrease in l2 increases proﬁts
but decreases the wage. The net eﬀect will depend upon consumer h’s
endowment of shares θh
2 relative to her endowment of potential work time.
It can be easily seen that a decrease in l2 plays a role of a wage tax. In order
to make the net eﬀect explicit we shall take the derivative of equation (4.2)














Therefore, a change in consumer h’s share ψh is increasing/ constant/ de-
creasing in Sector 2 activity if her share θh
2 in monopoly ﬁrm is less/ equal/
greater than the population average.
In order to proceed further we need to know the properties of the indi-
viduals’ indirect utilities (4.1). Deﬁne
m ≡
aβ








1(1 − α) + θh
2(α + a + b)
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where






(1 − n)(m + n)
n2 .
Notice that both m and n are positive and smaller than one, for α ≤ 1 and
β < 1. Also, since indirect utility is only for individuals that can aﬀord
consuming at all, we only look at budgets that allow positive consumption.
That is, we only consider θh
1, θh
2, and Lh such that ψh(0) > 0. This is
equivalent to ∆h > −1, which is the lowest level of ∆h to be considered in
the analysis. Hence, the indirect utility (4.1) has the following properties:
Lemma 4.1. (1) For ∆h < 0, V h(l2) reaches a global maximum at l2
L−l2 =
λ1 < m
n ; (2) For ∆h = 0, V h(l2) reaches a global maximum at l2
L−l2 =
λ1 = m
n ; (3) For 0 < ∆h ≤ n
r1−n, V h(l2) reaches a local maximum at
l2
L−l2 = λ2 > m
n ; (4) For ∆h > n
r1−n, V h(l2) is always increasing in l2; (5)





1 − m − n + r1 − n
then for 0 < ∆h ≤ n
r1−n, V h(l2) reaches a global maximum at l2
L−l2 = λ2.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Lemma 4.1 characterizes the curvature of the indirect utility function
for individuals with diﬀerent share endowments, relative to their time en-
dowments, ∆h. For individuals with ∆h < 0 or ∆h = 0 the indirect utility
function is concave and has one maximum, i.e., the individual have one ideal
point (Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 4.1). The only potential problem is for indi-
viduals with ∆h > 0, i.e., for individuals that have greater time endowments
than their share endowments. Then the utility function approaches inﬁnity
as the monopoly ﬁrm employs virtually all labor available in the economy
(Part 5 of Lemma 4.1). The reason for this is that the competitive sector’s
production approaches zero, which drives the price of the good produced by
the competitive sector to inﬁnity. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ence speciﬁcation. In order to have a well deﬁned problem we introduced a
smallest production unit in Sectors 1 and 2, (Equations 2.3 and 2.4, respec-
tively). This makes it possible only to choose l2 either in an interval, i.e.,
l2 ∈ [ε2,L − ε1], or zero.6
6That single peakedness fails for some individuals is not due to proﬁts turning negative
in the monopoly ﬁrm. To see this we proceed as follows. Proﬁts are non-negative as
long as (3.6), or alternatively (3.7), is non-negative. Using (2.11) and (2.12) in (3.6) gives
non-negative proﬁts if a ≥ bl2/(L − l). Using this in sector 1’s labor demand (2.19), and
substituting for l2 this condition can be written as l1 ≥ αL/(a + b + α). Obviously, as
l1 → 0, proﬁts in Sector 2 turns negative. However, requiring non-negative proﬁts does
not rule out the possibility of very large prices in Sector 1. We can be in a situation
where l1 = ε1 > αL/(a+b+α), that is, proﬁts in Sector 2 does not turn negative but theENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 13
If a shareholder has an interest in increasing production in the monopoly
ﬁrm to drive the competitive sector to zero production, she has to consider
either driving l1 to zero or to its smallest unit ε1. As utility is zero at
l1 = 0 (since there is no consumption of good 1), utility will be larger at
l1 = ε1. If ε1 is large enough, satisfying the condition in Lemma 4.1, then
there are some shareholders with ∆h > 0 that will have a well deﬁned global
maximum (Part 6 of Lemma 4.1).
Proposition 4.2. Consumer h prefers higher/ equal/ lower Sector 2 pro-
duction than the Competitive Economic Equilibrium level if and only if her
endowment of shares in the monopoly ﬁrm that is lower/ equal/ higher than
her relative time endowment Lh/L.
Proof. If the share endowment is smaller/ equal/ larger than the relative
time endowment, then
(4.4) ∆h > 0 , ∆h = 0 , ∆h < 0,














respectively, that is, lower than/ equal to the competitive equilibrium level
m









If ε1 is smaller than the condition in Lemma 4.1, then some or all individuals
with ∆h > 0 prefers
(4.7) l2 = L − ε,
that is, larger than the competitive equilibrium level. 
Proposition 4.2 emphasizes the distributional conﬂict in the economy. It
is only when the consumer’s share of the aggregate quantities is unaﬀected
by the production level in Sector 2, she wishes the competitive outcome. In
all other cases the consumer gains from redistributive consequences of using
monopoly power.
Rather than voting directly on the ﬁrm’s production decision, we will
assume that shareholders vote on candidates taken from the group of share-
holders, and the majority elected candidate will implement her preferred
production decision. We then truncate the policy space to values of l2 that
constraint on smallest production unit is binding. Requiring non-negative proﬁts is not
enough to guarantee single-peaked preferences.14 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
are ideal points of shareholders. This is necessary because preferences are
not single peaked in l2 for individuals with ∆h > 0 (see Lemma 4.1). How-
ever, preferences are single peaked in l2 when l2 is restricted to be an ideal
point of some shareholders and the assumption regarding ε1 in Part 6 of
Lemma 4.1 holds (see Lemma D.1 in Appendix D).
Now we are almost in the position where we can apply the median-voter
theorem. There is one more complication, however. If the monopoly ﬁrm
is not a co-operative, then voting rights are typically proportional to the
number of shares a shareholder owns. This implies that the median voter
is not the individual with the median ∆. This causes no problem, because
diﬀerential voting rights just alter the distribution. For example, take an
initial distribution of ∆h. We can then ﬁnd a new distribution over ∆h
to identify the median voter in the following way. An individual with n
times as many shares as another individual will enter the new distribution n
times. In this way a median voter is found as the individual cutting the new
distribution in half. We can then apply the median-voter theorem, since the
candidate preferred by the median voter in the ﬁrm cannot lose against any
other candidate. We will take this median-voter equilibrium as our political
equilibrium.
We shall therefore deﬁne a Shareholder Voting Equilibrium as the produc-
tion decision taken by a candidate decision maker who cannot lose against
any other candidate in a binary election (the electorate being the share-
holders), assuming that all shareholders costlessly can stand as candidates.
The candidate decision maker, whose production decision is implemented,
is referred to as the Median Voter.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose all consumers have the same time endowment
and that the restriction on ε1 in Lemma 4.1 holds, then in a Shareholder
Voting Equilibrium, the production in Sector 2 is higher/ equal/ lower than
in the Competitive Economic Equilibrium if the Median Voter owns a pro-
portion of shares in the monopoly ﬁrm that is less/ equal/ higher than the
inverse of the population size.
Proof. The ﬁrm’s production decision will be taken by the median share-
holder. The rest follows from Proposition 4.2. 
We shall now give examples of distributions of shares for which we have
underproduction as well as overproduction relative to the Competitive Eco-
nomic Equilibrium. First, consider a continuous diﬀerentiable distribution
function, Γ(θ2), given the number of individuals owning a share θ2 or less.










If voting rights are proportional to the number of shares an individual owns,
then the voter distribution is not the same as the ownership distribution.7 It
is not necessary to specify the number of votes each share carries, instead we
can normalize the total number of votes equal to unity. The median voter
would then be the individual with endowment where the voting distribution









This tend to make the median voter having a greater share than the median
in the ownership distribution.
There are distributions of shares for which underproduction occurs. The
simplest case, when the median voter owns more shares than the population
average, is when Γ(θ2) = υθ2, where υ is a positive constant. Then, Γ(ˆ θ2) =























2 = 21/2L−1 > L−1. That is, the median voter has a share greater
than the population average. 
There are also distributions of shares for which overproduction occurs.
We shall specify the following threshold values
0 < θ0
2 < θd
2 < ˆ θ2 < 0.5,





















2)2 and b =
1
(ˆ θ2)2 − (θd
2)2.
7The median in ownership is θ
m
2 such that Γ(θ
m
2 ) = L/2.16 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
For the distribution function above, the decisive individuals is the one en-
dowed with θd
2 (see Appendix E). Evaluating the distribution function at ˆ θ2,












ˆ θ2 + θd
2
.
Since Γ(ˆ θ2) = L, then θd
2 < L−1 if (and only if) the right-hand side in the






Obviously, there is a whole range of parameter values that satisfy this in-
equality (together with 0 < θ0
2 < θd
2 < ˆ θ2 < 0.5). As a numerical example,
let θ0
2 = 0.1, θd
2 = 0.15, and ˆ θ2 = 0.4, then Γ(ˆ θ2) = 5.8181... = L. Thus,
L−1 = 0.171875 > θd
2. 
We will next consider a publicly owned monopoly, i.e., a nationalized mo-
nopoly. We assume that there is no other function of the government, for
the sake of simplicity. A publicly owned monopoly would be characterized
by equal ownership. Hence, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm is assumed to be handed
out lump-sum to the population. The government is modelled as a repre-
sentative democracy. We will also assume that any individual can stand as
a candidate, and analogously to our deﬁnition of Shareholder Voting Equi-
librium, we shall deﬁne a Politico-Economic Equilibrium as the production
decision taken by a candidate government representative who cannot lose
against any other candidate in a binary election (the electorate being the
entire population), assuming all individuals in the economy costlessly can
stand as candidates. The candidate decision maker, whose production deci-
sion is implemented, is referred to as the Median Voter.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that all consumers have the same time endow-
ment, then a publicly owned monopoly in a democracy performs as a com-
petitive ﬁrm in Politico-Economic Equilibrium.
Proof. When the ﬁrm is nationalized all consumers will have the same pro-
portion of the ﬁrm which implies Lh/L = θh
2 for all h, and all consumers will
support the production choice. This in turn implies Competitive Economic
Equilibrium. 
The above result depends upon the assumption on equal wage for all con-
sumers. Suppose now that consumers diﬀer linearly in terms of productivity.
The wage for consumer h is then given by
(4.8) ωh = γhω,ENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 17




We shall now focus on the changes of the key equations. Equation (2.8),
(2.16), and (4.2) will then be modiﬁed in the following way:
(4.10)
Z





= ψh (l1,l2)(L − l),
(4.12) ψh (l2) =
θh
1 (1 − α) + θh
2

a − (α + b) l2
L−l2

+ (α + b)
γhLh
L−l2




γhLhdh, that is, total aggregate time in eﬃciency units. We
shall note that the economy still has linear sharing rules, so that ψh is the
consumer’s share of each of the aggregate goods.
The analysis of the indirect utility function in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma











Proposition 4.5. Suppose that consumers diﬀer in productivity as in (4.8),
but not in time endowments, and that the monopoly ﬁrm production decision
is taken by shareholder voting, then the Competitive Economic Equilibrium
is reached if the median voter in the ﬁrm has a share equal to her relative
productivity divided by the population size.
















+ aβ (1 − η)L

,
which is zero for η = 1. This implies l2 = l∗





This completes the proof. 
Proposition 4.5 has important implications. It says that Pareto eﬃcient
outcome can be reached even with a right skewed distribution of shares, if
the relatively more productive consumers are endowed with relatively larger
proportions of shares in the monopoly ﬁrm. However, when the ﬁrm is
publicly owned we have the following property:18 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Proposition 4.6. Suppose that all consumers have the same time endow-
ment, then a publicly owned monopoly acts as a competitive ﬁrm in Politico-
Economic Equilibrium if the distribution of skills is symmetric. If the distri-
bution of skills is right/ left skewed the publicly owned monopoly will under/
over produce.
Proof. When the ﬁrm is publicly owned all individuals have the same pro-
portions of the ﬁrm. The median voter will then be the individual endowed
with median skill, γmedian. This individual’s choice will be characterized by
∆ evaluated at γ = γmedian. If the distribution of skills is symmetric the
median coincides with the mean and ∆ = 0. If
γmedian < γmean = 1,
then ∆ < 0, and if
γmedian > γmean = 1,
then ∆ > 0. The rest follows from Proposition 4.2. 
5. Trade in Shares
First we look at a situation when individuals do not recognize their inﬂu-
ence on the decision of the monopoly ﬁrm. Then, only the returns of shares
will matter. The relative share prices would in equilibrium be such that
nobody has incentive to trade. Second, we look at the situation when all
individuals are strategic, i.e., they realize that when trading (thus changing
their ownership) they will inﬂuence the decision taken by the monopoly ﬁrm.
Finally, we will look at the eﬀects of constraints on trading (short-selling and
credit constraints), when individuals are strategic.
In all cases we begin with an initial distribution of shares, then we allow
the individuals to trade, and we examine which distribution of share consti-
tute an equilibrium. The economy is still as in the previous sections, just
that individuals prior to the voting stage can trade their shares.
We will denote the individual h’s initial share ownership by ¯ θh
1 and ¯ θh
2,
and the prices of shares by q1 and q2, respectively. For simplicity, we will
treat share ownership in the competitive sector as an index portfolio. We
could price the competitive ﬁrms individually8, but to save on notation we
allow individuals to trade in the index only.
We shall allow for the most general case where individuals may diﬀer
in both time endowments and in labor productivities. The objective of an
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individual is to maximize her indirect utility (4.1) and (4.12), subject to
(5.1) q1θh
1 + q2θh
2 = q1¯ θh
1 + q2¯ θh
2.
Since the relative share price, q2/q1, is a function of ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts, which
in turn is a function of ﬁrm 2’s decision, l2, we may write q2/q1 = Q(l2).
Equation (5.1) allows us to write ¯ θh
1 + (q2/q1)(¯ θh
2 − θh
2), then taking the
derivative of the individual h’s indirect utility (4.1) with respect to θh
2 gives





























The ﬁrst two terms in Equation (5.2) reﬂect the direct eﬀect of trading
shares, i.e., the marginal utility of giving up θh
1 for θh
2. The terms within
square brackets reﬂect the strategic eﬀect of trading (since trading changes
the political equilibrium in the monopoly ﬁrm). The ﬁrst of those terms
is the marginal utility of changing share prices (due to the change in the
monopoly ﬁrm’s decision). The second term is the direct eﬀect of changing
the monopoly ﬁrm’s decision (which was the focus of section 4 in this paper).
We now turn to examine the various consequences of trading in shares.
5.1. Non-strategic Investors. If no individual realizes that trading in
shares changes the political equilibrium in the monopoly ﬁrm when changing
the ownership, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that the restriction on ε1 in Lemma 4.1 holds.
If investors do not recognize their inﬂuence on the decision of the monopoly
ﬁrm when trading shares, then any initial distribution of shares can consti-
tute a Shareholder Voting Equilibrium.
Proof. For non-strategic investors the square brackets of (5.2) is ignored.




















where the second and third equalities follow from (4.1) and (4.12). All
investors face the same prices, q2/q1, and are indiﬀerent trading their initial
portfolios. 
Thus, in this case, opening the stock market does not change anything
of the previous analysis, and share ownership can be treated as exogenous.
The reason is that equilibrium prices of shares are such that no individual
has an incentive to trade. Notice also that Proposition 5.1 does not depend
on the speciﬁc functional forms of the utility and production functions. Any20 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
function would have the property that the ﬁrst two equalities hold, and
consequently q2/q1 is independent of individual characteristics.
5.2. Strategic Investors. If investors recognize that when purchasing /
selling shares of the monopoly ﬁrm they change the identity of the deci-
sive individual, there are two consequences. First, individuals may purchase
additional shares (deviating from the initial distribution) to acquire voting
rights and aﬀect the decision in their desired direction. Second, by pur-
chasing / selling shares, the individuals also aﬀect the equilibrium prices of
shares. These incentives are captured by the terms within square brackets
in Equation (5.2). The strategic eﬀect drastically reduces the number of
possible equilibria. In fact we have the following result.
Proposition 5.2. If all investors realize their inﬂuence on the decision of
the ﬁrm when trading shares, and if there are no restrictions on trading,







(3) Competitive equilibrium [Equations (3.2) - (3.5)].
Proof. Investors being strategic implies that the whole of (5.2) must be taken
in to account. Dividing (5.2) with respect to ∂V h/∂θh


























A decisive individual, where ¯ θh
2 is such that ∂V h/∂l2 = 0, is in equilibrium
only if the ﬁrst two terms of (5.4) cancel, i.e., if (5.3) holds. This implies that
the term within square brackets must be zero for all h. This in turn implies
that ∂V h/∂l2 = 0 for all h, i.e., shareholder unanimity. Suppose ∂V h/∂l2 >
0 (or ∂V h/∂l2 < 0) for some h, then this individual wishes to increase
(or reduce) l2, and wish to purchase more θh
2 in order to aﬀect the voting
outcome in the desired direction, that is, ∂l2/∂θh
2 > 0 (or ∂l2/∂θh
2 < 0),
since if the individual remains at ¯ θh
2 the ﬁrst order variation (5.4) is positive.
This implies that all individuals in the economy must have ∂V h/∂l2 = 0. It
follows that all individuals hold shares so as to satisfy θh
















+ Chf(h)dh = 1 +
Z
Chf(h)dh,
where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of L. However, the
shares must sum to unity, therefore Ch must be zero for all h, in turn
implying η = 1, that is, the competitive equilibrium. 
If we were in a situation, with an initial distribution of shares, such that
a non-competitive equilibrium was reached, with the resulting ineﬃciency,
shareholders always have the incentive to trade their shares until the ineﬃ-
ciency is eliminated, i.e., until the competitive equilibrium is reached. This
result is very close to the Coase conjecture if property rights are well de-
ﬁned. Trade in those property rights would ensure that any ineﬃciencies are
internalized. Our result suggests that when stock markets are well function-
ing, any ineﬃciency due to market power would be eliminated. However,
our equilibrium may require some individuals to go short in the competitive
sector, i.e., take a negative position in the competitive sector in order to
purchase a share θh
2 = γhLh/L.9 Alternatively, the individual can write a
debt contract in terms of commodity 1 (the good produced by the competi-
tive sector). If short sales are not allowed (or alternatively if there are credit
constraints), the equilibrium in Proposition 5.2 may not be reached. This
leads us to investigate short-selling constraints in the next section.
5.3. Short-Selling Constraints. If investors cannot go short in the com-
petitive sector, the share distribution θh
2 = γhLh/L may be infeasible. In
such a situation some investors will be constrained, and their ﬁrst order vari-
ation of indirect utility with respect to θh
2 will not be equal to zero. However,
among investors for whom the short selling constraint does not bind, i.e.,
they own initial positions large enough, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.3. If all investors realize their inﬂuence on the decision of
the ﬁrm when trading shares, and if short-selling is not allowed (or if debt
contracts are not allowed), then for investors with endowments large enough
for the short-selling constraint not to be binding, the following hold.
(1) γhLh/L = θh
2;
(2) Unanimity with regard to the choice of l2.
The equilibrium is not necessarily the competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. Follows ﬁrst part of the proof of Proposition 5.2. 
To go any further, we need to know the initial distribution of shares. The
way in which short-selling constraints bind depends critically on the initial
distribution of shares and how this may be correlated with productivity /
time endowment. We will consider a number of examples.
First,we will investigate a situation where a fraction, δ, of the population
own no shares at all, the other fraction, 1 − δ, own equal amount of shares
(both in competitive sector and in the monopoly ﬁrm), and no correlation
between productivity and share ownership. Among the individuals owning
no shares, all types must be represented according to the population dis-
tribution. Those owning shares will trade in such a way that shareholder











where Ch is deﬁned in (5.5). Using (4.12)
R







(1 − η) =








We see that the larger δ the smaller η. When a fraction of the popula-
tion owns no shares initially, and there are short selling constraints, in any
equilibrium post trade in shares they will still own no shares. If there is
no correlation between share ownership and the underlying heterogeneity
(productivity and time endowments), the larger the fraction without shares,
the smaller is the production of the monopoly ﬁrm (further away from the
competitive equilibrium).
Furthermore, from Equation (5.8) we can verify Proposition 5.2 when δ
is zero. Note also that as δ → 1, η > 0. In the extreme case, as in the
limit an inﬁnitely small fraction own the monopoly (and the competitive
sector), production is strictly positive. Thus, even in the extreme case, we
cannot reproduce the ﬁrm objective suggested by the traditional industrial
organization literature. This strengthens our view that the traditional ﬁrm
objectives are inconsistent with rationality of the owners.
6. Conclusion
We have endogenized the objective of a monopoly ﬁrm through share-
holder voting, in a simple two-sector general equilibrium model. In thisENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 23
way we ensured that the ﬁrm’s objective is consistent with the preferences
of the owners, which it would fail to be under traditional proﬁt maximiza-
tion. When the shareholders realize that the ﬁrm has market power, we
showed that rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underpro-
duction, relative to the CEE. For certain distribution of shares the CEE
allocation was obtained. We characterized the properties of the underlying
distribution of shares for either case to be generated. We also found that a
nationalized monopoly, when all individuals own the same amount of shares,
may underproduce relative to the CEE.
Finally we endogenized share ownership by allowing trade in shares. If
investors are myopic in the sense that they do not recognize their inﬂuence
on the voting outcome, and thereby on the share prices, when they trade,
then any distribution of shares could constitute an equilibrium. If indi-
viduals realize their inﬂuence on the voting outcome when trading, and if
individuals are allowed to sell short their shares, then trade occurs until the
distribution of shares is such that the voting outcome supports the CEE.
This result is close to the Coase Theorem, in the sense that the economy
trades itself to eﬃciency. If individuals are not allowed to sell short their
shares then we showed that the equilibrium is such that all shareholders
agree on the production decision, but it typically involves underproduction
relative to the CEE. We conclude that it is not market power itself which
causes underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights (i.e.,
shares) in the economy.24 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Appendix A
Firm j solves Equation (2.18) taking prices as given. Then each ﬁrm’s



























Aggregating over all ﬁrms in the competitive sector, we obtain







































Note that since l = l1 +l2 by deﬁnition, Equation (A.5) becomes (2.19) and
(A.6) becomes (2.20).
Appendix B
The monopoly ﬁrm chooses l2 to solve Equation (3.1), which gives demand
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Combining (A.5) and (B.3) yields (3.2), and combining (2.19) and (3.2)
yields (3.3). Furthermore, combining (3.2) and (3.3) together with (2.20)
yields (3.4). Substituting (3.4) into (3.1) yields (3.5).
Appendix C




then (4.2) together with the deﬁnitions for ˜ θh and ∆h gives
ψh(z) = ˜ θh(1 + ∆hz)
and (4.1) then gives
lnV h(z)
1 + a + b
= ln ˜ θh + ln(1 + ∆hz) + mln(z − 1) − (m + n)lnz.











∆h(z − 1)z + [m − n(z − 1)](1 + ∆hz)
(1 + ∆hz)(z − 1)z
=
(1 − n)∆h
(1 + ∆hz)(z − 1)z



















1 + ∆hz)(z − 1)z
(z − 1 − λ1)(z − 1 − λ2),
where λ1,2 are deﬁned in Lemma 4.1. Since 0 < n < 1 and 0 < m < 1, the
roots r1,2 are real and satisfy
r1 > 1 − m + 2
m
n
> r2 ≥ n > 0.










0 < ∆h ≤
n
r1 − n
we have two roots satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition (FOV=0).26 THOMAS RENSTR¨ OM AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
For z − 1 < λ2, FOV > 0 (since λ2 < λ1); for z − 1 = λ2, FOV = 0; for
λ2 < z − 1 < λ1, FOV < 0; for z − 1 = λ1, FOV = 0; and for λ2 ≤ z − 1,
FOV > 0. Thus, going from the smaller root to the larger decreases utility.
In fact, λ1 is a local minimum, and we can concentrate on λ2.
λ2 is a local maximum for an individual with




That λ2 > m
n is straightforward to verify.
In the case −1 < ∆h < 0, λ1,2 are always real and only λ1 is of interest
(since λ2 < 0 here). λ1 is the global maximum since when z − 1 < λ1,
FOV > 0 and when z −1 > λ1, FOV < 0. That λ1 < m
n is straightforward
to verify.













n is the global maximum since when z −1 < m
n , FOV > 0 and when
z − 1 > m
n , FOV < 0.
When l2 → L, z → +∞. The objective may be written as
V h(z)
1
















When the smallest unit of production in Section 1 is reached at l1 = ε,
an individual with preferences for a corner solution has to compare l1 = 0
against l1 = ε. However, at l1 = 0, V h = 0, thus l2 = L can never be
preferred. When ε equals the constraint in Lemma 1, employment in Sector





A individual with ∆h < n
r1−n will prefer her own local maximum to the local
maximum of ∆h = n
r1−n. Thus, each individual’s local maximum is a global
maximum. 
10To see this, consider such an individual with a local maximum at λ =
r1−(1+m)
z(1−n) . This
implies L − l2 =
z(1−n)L
1−m−n+r1−n. Next, l1 =
α
α+b(L − l2). Replacing l1 by ε gives the
condition.ENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 27
Appendix D
Denote a candidate with superscript c. Since a candidate’s most preferred
l2 is a function of her ∆c, we can replace l2 with its function of ∆c in an
individual’s (say individual h 6= c) indirect utility function, to obtain an
indirect utility function in ∆c. Then preferences of shareholder h will be
single peaked in ∆c, with the maximum reached at ∆c = ∆h.
Lemma D.1. Assume ε1 satisﬁes the inequality in Lemma 4.1, and that
candidates are shareholders, then individual shareholders’ preferences over
candidates are single peaked.
Proof. We know from Lemma 4.1 that an individual with ∆h < 0 or ∆h = 0
has single peaked preferences over all l2. The only potential problem is
for individuals with ∆h > 0. We know from Appendix C that the utility
function for such a shareholder has a local minimum at l2
L−l2 = λ1. We must
then make sure that no potential candidate would implement l2
L−l2 > λ1, for
any λ1. Thus we must ensure that the individual with the smallest λ1 has λ1
larger than (or equal to) the maximum possible l2/(L − l2). The maximum
possible l2/(L − l2) is when l1 is driven to ε1. This implies that l2/(L − l2)
cannot be larger than the maximum for an individual with ∆h = n
r1−n
(see end of Appendix C). We then need to ﬁnd the smallest λ1. From the
deﬁnition of λ1 we see that it is increasing in ∆h. therefore the smallest λ1
is reached for an individual with ∆h = n
r1−n. This is when λ1 = λ2 and we
have an inﬂexion point. Thus for any candidate with −1 < ∆h ≤ n
r1−n, the
candidate’s most preferred l2/(L−l2) will never reach the region where any
other individual’s indirect utility reaches beyond its eventual local minimum.
This is also true for a candidate with ∆h > n
r1−n, since she prefers the same
level of l2/(L − l2) as an individual with ∆h = n
r1−n to the level where
l1 is driven to zero (because utility reaches zero at that level). Thus any
individual’s preferences are single peaked over l2 that are restricted to be
optima for some other shareholders. Since a candidate will implement her
most preferred l2, shareholders have single peaked preferences over the types
of the candidates, i.e., over ∆c. 
Appendix E
To show that the decisive individual has a share equal to θd
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Inserting the deﬁnition of a gives the result. To show that the number of
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ˆ θ2 − θd
2
.
The result follows. ENDOGENOUS FIRM OBJECTIVES 29
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